We examine how boards decide on CEO compensation depending on how informative stock prices are. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decisions, we use extreme mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent with informed boards...

We examine whether boards are sufficiently well-informed to make efficient decisions on CEO compensation. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decision on CEO compensation, we use mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent...

The role of outside directors is one of the key features in the transatlantic corporate governance debate. As their importance rises, their liability is also attracting attention. Since there are only a few cases internationally in which outside directors of listed companies have been held...

We find that the presence of independent directors who are blockholders (IDBs) in firms promotes better CEO contracting and monitoring, and higher firm valuation. Using a panel of about 11,500 firm-years with a unique, hand-collected dataset on IDB-identity and a novel instrument, we find that...

This study investigates the market reaction to appointments and departures of independent directors to boards and various board committees, as well as the magnitude of the market reaction based to the expertise and busyness of these directors. The findings suggest that investors in Turkish...

To gain insights about the quality of boards' firing decisions, we investigate abnormal stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand-collected sample of 208 "clean'' turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the majority of previous...

This study investigates market reactions to announcements of CEO turnover and finds that forced turnovers are not accompanied by positive returns, which contradicts the broad view that firing a CEO sends a positive signal to the market. This contradiction is further explored by focusing on the...

Staggered boards (or classified boards) constitute one of the most controversial governance provisions. A fierce debate continues on the costs and benefits of staggered boards. We contribute to the debate by investigating how financial analysts view staggered boards. It has been argued that...

The objective of this paper is to examine whether underpricing is associated with board structure and corporate ownership among Indonesian IPO firms. To capture the most recent development, the sample comprises 101 firms conducting initial public offerings (IPOs) in Indonesia's primary equity...