This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their...

This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their...

This paper examines insider trading around first-time debt covenant violation disclosures in SEC filings, and is interesting from a research and regulatory standpoint for three reasons – delay and infrequency of a first-time disclosure, lack of attention to covenant disclosures by regulators,...

This article is based on a lecture at Nihon College of Law in Tokyo and draws on William K.S. Wang & Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading (Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2010); and William K.S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators, and Remedies–Including an Analogy to Fraud in...

In this paper we note that unrelated research in the management and finance fields, if combined, makes predictions concerning board reforms in emerging countries. Specifically, outside directors' demographic characteristics that are salient to foreign investors should reduce stock price...

This paper shows stock exchange trading rules are of central importance for the trading location of cross-listed stocks. We also consider various measures of sovereign governance and shareholder rights across countries to assess the complementary effects of other legal and institutional drivers...

This paper examines the relationship between firm size, sovereign governance, and value-creation in acquisitions. The takeover literature suggests that size can enable managerial entrenchment and value-destruction. However, in weak governance environments, size might have off-setting benefits,...

Governance has many dimensions – corporate governance pertains to the firm's management whilst sovereign governance pertains to the firm's exposure to sovereign risk, corruption, and poor regulation. We show that both are important drivers of firm value and this has serious implications for...

Whereas the agency theory predicts that dual-class shares decrease firm performance, the stewardship theory predicts that dual-class shares increase firm performance. The cumulative findings on the performance consequences of dual-class shares have been weak and/or inconclusive. Because...