We investigate an emerging pay-performance activism under a natural setting of performance-focused shareholder proposals rule (PSPs) (Rule 14a-8) established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for top management compensation. We find that: (1) PSP sponsors successfully identify...

Shareholder activism on sustainability issues has become increasingly prevalent over the years, with the number of proposals filed doubling from 1999 to 2013. We use recent innovations in accounting standard setting to classify 2,665 shareholder proposals that address environmental and social...

In this paper, we investigate the effect of shareholder activism on earnings management. Using a US sample of shareholder pay-for-performance proposals sponsored by institutional investors, we find that when compared to control firms, firms targeted by shareholder proposals have a greater...

An effective bank resolution regime requires taking action while the bank still has positive net worth and shareholder claims still have economic value. Such actions raise a number of legal issues with respect to the rights of shareholders. This paper aims to consider how to strike a balance...

This paper describes the results of a study supported by the Thai Stock Exchange, that examined the relationship of five factors, family ownership, legal protection for investors, corporate governance practice of shareholder rights, cash flow and bank performance, to minority shareholder rights...

In the post-financial crisis regulatory reforms emphasis has been placed on creating recovery and resolution frameworks for banks, which ensure that the costs of failure are primarily born by shareholders, instead of taxpayers and the wider economy. Supervisors have (or will have) extensive...

This paper conducts the first assessment of shareholder activism in banking and its effects on risk and performance. The focus is on the conflicts among bank shareholders, managers, and creditors (e.g., regulators, deposit insurer, taxpayers, depositors). This paper finds activism may generally...

The empirical results, from a sample of about 250 banks worldwide, indicate that the expected government support of banks does not weaken market discipline by shareholders. Specifically, shareholders are not willing to pay more for banks with higher expected support. On the contrary, they are...

We examine shareholder litigation and the price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. After the lawsuit filing, defendant firms pay higher loan spreads, up-front charges, experience more financial covenants, and are more likely to have a collateral requirement. These findings are...

We investigate the implications of government versus private ownership for bank minority shareholders. Specifically, we use unique data to examine whether the stock prices of government-owned and family-owned banks, equally engaged in related lending, differently react to loan announcements. Our...