This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from...

Chapter 1 Corporate Governance: An Introduction -- Chapter 2 Boards and Directors -- Chapter 3 Theoretical Perspectives of Corporate Governance -- Chapter 4 Internal Control, Financial Oversight and Risk Management -- Chapter 5 Global Corporate Governance Movement -- Chapter 6 Shareholders and...

We relate the agency issues inherent in management buyouts and in earnings management. Income-reducing earnings management occurs prior to management buyouts. When insiders own small amounts of stock, outside monitoring mechanisms such as institutional ownership and Big Six audit firms reduce...

Voting in directors' elections is one of few mechanisms by which shareholders can influence corporate governance choices. We study elections of directors who serve on the audit committee (AC), a topic receiving little attention in past work. Our results show that AC members, especially those who...