Purpose–The purpose of this paper is to study the capital structure of firms when controlling shareholders decide on the level of debt financing in an environment with poor legal protection. Design/methodology/approach–Theoretically this paper uses a dynamic model to analyze how the...

This paper examines the origins of investor protection under the common law by analysing the development of shareholder protection in Victorian Britain, the home of the common law. In this era, very little was codified, with corporate law simply suggesting a default template of rules....

This paper examines the origins of investor protection under the common law by analysing the development of shareholder protection in Victorian Britain, the home of the common law. In this era, very little was codified, with corporate law simply suggesting a default template of rules....

Advanced systems of domestic corporate law generally apply a “no reflective loss” principle to shareholder claims. Shareholder claims are permitted for direct injury to shareholder rights (such as voting rights). But shareholders generally cannot bring claims for reflective loss incurred as...

Corporate law in advanced domestic legal systems on the one hand, and typical treaties for the protection of foreign investment on the other hand, treat claims for damages by company shareholders differently. Advanced domestic systems generally bar shareholders from claiming for reflective loss...

We study the dynamic causal effects of the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholder on tunneling behavior in China. We use control-right-transfers as the event to conduct the study. We obtain 394 control-right-transfer samples in China corporate control market from 2001 to 2008. We use...

There are two main sources of confusion in the public corporate governance debate. One is the confusion about the role of public policy intervention. The other is a lack of empirical knowledge about the corporate landscape where rules are supposed to be implemented and the functioning of...

The literature on shareholder voting has mostly focused on the influence of proxy advisors on shareholder votes. We exploit a unique empirical setting enabling us to provide a direct estimate of management's influence. Analyzing shareholder votes on the frequency of future say on pay votes, we...

In India, ownership of most listed firms is concentrated in the hands of a group or family of promoters. Indian regulators have adopted the Anglo-American governance recipe of firm monitoring through Independent Directors (IDs) to ensure the protection of minority interest. The efficacy of this...

Recent studies document the increasing effectiveness of shareholder voting as a monitoring mechanism. Because both directors and the market respond to shareholder votes, management has stronger incentives to influence voting outcomes. We identify one channel through which management can affect...