A good corporate governance framework should combine transparency, accountability and integrity and this requires knowledge of beneficial ownership. The protection of minority investors and other stakeholder protection will be challenging without access to reliable information about the...

Investor confidence in financial markets depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of publicly listed companies. This is particularly true for corporate governance systems that are...

Vital in preserving managerial accountability, the firmly established one share, one vote rule provides shareholders with limited rights to elect directors who appoint managers and to approve certain extraordinary transactions. Without the deterrents of risk of capital loss and fear of removal,...

In recent years there have been two parallel discussions taking place in the US and in the UK about the role which institutional shareholders should play in governing the corporation. In the US this discussion is around the idea of shareholder empowerment, in the UK it is around shareholder...

Does managerial entrenchment create or destroy shareholder value? This Article presents both theory and evidence that the answer to this question is not monolithic, but rather depends on factors that vary greatly with the macroeconomic climate, such as firm profitability, takeover frequency, and...

Modern perceptions of good corporate governance assume that the general meeting has a meaningful role in the governance of listed companies and that shareholders make responsible use of their voting rights. Assessments after the financial crisis, however, indicate that institutional investors by...

This article attempts to disentangle the various issues a public company should consider when answering the question: “to go or not to go private?” It provides a review of the literature with an eye towards coverage of the main questions a practitioner would ask. The article explores factors...

Some pressure groups propagate that agency costs in companies could be reduced if shareholders would have access to board minutes as the shareholders would have first hand information regarding the affairs of the reporting entity rather than analysing the company through annual reports which...

We survey theoretical and empirical research on antitakeover provisions, focusing on the relationship between antitakeover provisions and shareholder value. We divide the empirical studies based upon the evidence that they provide: short-term event studies, studies on performance and policy...