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Frictional asset reallocation under adverse selection

Madison, Florian - 2018 - Revised version

The aim of this paper is to study asset reallocation in financial markets subject to search, bargaining, and … consequence, a positive liquidity differential between money and real assets emerges, resulting in an increased demand for fiat … money, as observed since the eruption of the global financial crisis. A policy intervention replacing information sensitive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011790391

Monetary policy with imperfect signals : the target problem in a new monetarist approach

Draack, Hannes - 2018

information to the model of [Berentsen and Waller, 2011], a divide between an interest rate policy and a money stock policy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900176

Endogenous Information and Central Bank Transparency

Tamura, Wataru - 2015

This paper studies monetary policy under discretion when the central bank ex ante determines information to be acquired and made public. In a general setting, wherein a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information, I show that an optimal information policy comprises the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026571

Optimal transport of information

Malamud, Semyon; Cieślak, Anna; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2021 - This version: March 3, 2021

We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is always given by a partition. Second, we take the limit of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012487719

Policy announcement design

Cieślak, Anna; Malamud, Semyon; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2020 - This version: December 15, 2019

We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181571

Assortative matching through signals

Poeschel, Friedrich - 2013

When agents do not know where to find a match, they search. However, agents could direct their search to agents who … strategically choose a certain signal. Introducing cheap talk to a model of sequential search with bargaining, we find that signals …-crossing property and sorting condition coincide. As the information from signals allows agents to avoid all unnecessary search, this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010128388

Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint

Heumann, Tibor - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 319-359

We study a principal--agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the process by which the agent learns his type and, concurrently, the screening mechanism. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159075

Bayesian Persuasion by an Informed Mechanism Designer

Zhang, Jun; Chen, Yanlin - 2022

We investigate how an informed designer maximizes her objective when facinga player whose payoff depends on both the designer's private information andon an unknown state within the classical quasilinear environment. Thedesigner can disclose arbitrary information about the state via...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294529

Counterfeiting, screening and government policy

Kang, Kee-Youn - In: Journal of economic theory 172 (2017), pp. 26-54

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777046

Information and Racial Exclusion

Lundberg, Shelly; Startz, Richard - 2004

information about the return to transactions with particular agents. In a search framework, signaling supports not simply a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262133