Showing 1 - 10 of 1,921
The aim of this paper is to study asset reallocation in financial markets subject to search, bargaining, and … consequence, a positive liquidity differential between money and real assets emerges, resulting in an increased demand for fiat … money, as observed since the eruption of the global financial crisis. A policy intervention replacing information sensitive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011790391
information to the model of [Berentsen and Waller, 2011], a divide between an interest rate policy and a money stock policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900176
This paper studies monetary policy under discretion when the central bank ex ante determines information to be acquired and made public. In a general setting, wherein a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information, I show that an optimal information policy comprises the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026571
We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is always given by a partition. Second, we take the limit of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012487719
We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181571
When agents do not know where to find a match, they search. However, agents could direct their search to agents who … strategically choose a certain signal. Introducing cheap talk to a model of sequential search with bargaining, we find that signals …-crossing property and sorting condition coincide. As the information from signals allows agents to avoid all unnecessary search, this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010128388
We study a principal--agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the process by which the agent learns his type and, concurrently, the screening mechanism. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159075
We investigate how an informed designer maximizes her objective when facinga player whose payoff depends on both the designer's private information andon an unknown state within the classical quasilinear environment. Thedesigner can disclose arbitrary information about the state via...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294529
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777046
information about the return to transactions with particular agents. In a search framework, signaling supports not simply a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262133