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Competitive screening under heterogeneous information

Garrett, Daniel M.; Gomes, Renato; Maestri, Lucas Jóver - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010382127

Banning information as a redistributive device

Gottlieb, Daniel (contributor); Maestri, Lucas (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002172123

Reputation and Screening in a Noisy Environment with Irreversible Actions

Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2020

We introduce a class of two-player dynamic games to study the effectiveness of screening in a principal-agent problem. In every period, the principal chooses either to irreversibly stop the game or to continue, and the agent chooses an action if the principal chooses to continue. The agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832336

Competitive screening under heterogeneous information

Garrett, Daniel F.; Gomes, Renato; Maestri, Lucas Jóver - In: The review of economic studies : RES 86 (2019) 4, pp. 1590-1630

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012111872

Experimentation and project selection : screening and learning

Gomes, Renato; Gottlieb, Daniel; Maestri, Lucas Jóver - In: Games and economic behavior 96 (2016), pp. 145-169

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011742204

Learning from manipulable signals

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Gorno, Leandro; Maestri, Lucas Jóver; … - In: American economic review 112 (2022) 12, pp. 3995-4040

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014229442