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The paper formalizes the intuition that brands are consumed for image reasons and that advertising creates a brand's image. The key idea is that advertising informs the public of brand names and creates the possibility of conspicuous consumption by rendering brands a signalling device. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366557
This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an expost outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent's information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without expost outside options, the optimal contract is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333968
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003575169
This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an expost outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent's information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without expost outside options, the optimal contract is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009381855
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009308109
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009723627
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010363441
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198529
The paper extends the optimal delegation framework pioneered by Holmström (1977, 1984) to a dynamic environment where, at the outset, the agent privately knows his ability to interpret decision relevant private information received later on. We show that any mechanism can be implemented by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198973
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340371