This paper analyzes the protection of a common pool resource (CPR) through the management of information. Specifically, we examine an entry deterrence model between an incumbent perfectly informed about the initial stock of a CPR and an uninformed potential entrant. In our model, the...

This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...

We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on the latter's abilities, which are private information....

A large literature in strategy and management has focused on why firms self-regulate and "signal green." We show this decision becomes more complex when regulators have enforcement discretion, and both firms and regulators act strategically. We model the managerial decision whether to signal the...

This work takes a closer look on the predominant assumption in usual lemon market models of having finitely many or even only two different levels of quality. We model a situation which is close to the classical monopolistic setting but admits an interval of possible quality values....

This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Depending on his valuation, a contestant may have an incentive to bluff or sandbag...

This paper analyzes mediation as a signal. Starting from a stylized case, a game theoretical model of one-sided incomplete information, taken from Cho and Kreps (1987), is applied to discuss strategic effects of mediation. It turns out that to reject mediation can be interpreted as a "negative...

This paper examines countries' free-riding in international environmental agreements (IEA) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and second, countries do not have complete information about other countries' noncompliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country leading the...

Do public policy signals improve the alignment of market outcomes with economic fundamentals? Existing work contends that, when individual players have an incentive to coordinate their actions, public policy signals could steer these actions away from the fundamentals. We argue that such a...