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Transparency aversion and insurance market equilibria
Gemmo, Irina; Browne, Mark Joseph; Gründl, Helmut - 2017
to adverse selection in insurance markets. However, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private … risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as … digitalization. It shows that new technologies bring new ways to challenge crosssubsidization in insurance markets and stresses the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011724373
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Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets : On-Demand Contracts As a Screening Device
Braun, Alexander - 2020
We show that on-demand insurance contracts, an innovative form of coverage recently introduced through the InsurTech …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822927
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Does signaling work in markets for information services? An empirical investigation for insurance intermediaries in Germany
Eckardt, Martina - 2007
Insurance intermediation services are information services which exhibit strong information asymmetries. We empirically … analyze whether signaling works in the German market for insurance intermediation services. For this a signal must increase …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319249
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Does signaling work in markets for information services? : an empirical investigation for insurance intermediaries in Germany
Eckardt, Martina - 2007
Insurance intermediation services are information services which exhibit strong information asymmetries. We empirically … analyze whether signaling works in the German market for insurance intermediation services. For this a signal must increase … the resulting problems. -- signaling ; insurance intermediation ; information services …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003886031
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Insurance or Signals? An Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Under Risk
Mudambi, Ram - 2014
insurance often provide signals with regard to the individuals' underlying quality characteristics. Since the same action … weight of the mandatory final exam in the overall course grade. The literature on insurance markets predicts that poorer … students would take more pre-final tests (tests as insurance); and further that a greater number of pre-final tests would …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068774
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The revelation and delegation principles in common agency games
Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - 2001
In the context of common agency adverse-selection games weillustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to studyequilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate thatan extension of the taxation principle what we term the delegation principle can be used to characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400675
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Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard
Houben, Eike - 2002 - First Version: March 2002, this Version: December 2002
The paper offers a new explanation for the widely observed use of redeemable and convertible preferred stock in venture capital finance. Redeemable and convertible preferred stocks can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow and control rights as a function of the state of nature, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011281511
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Portfolio liquidation and security design with private information
DeMarzo, Peter M.; Frankel, David M.; Jin, Yu - 2015 - This Revision: November 7, 2015
We consider a privately informed issuer which holds a portfolio of assets that can be sold to raise cash, where the fractions of assets sold serve as a multidimensional signal. If good news about one asset is good news for the others, then there is a unique equilibrium that satisfies the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011862114
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Financial expertise as an arms race
Glode, Vincent; Green, Richard C.; Lowery, Richard - 2010 - Rev.
We show that firms intermediating trade have incentives to overinvest in financial expertise, and that these investments can be destabilizing. Financial expertise in our model improves firms' ability to accurately estimate value when trading a security. It creates adverse selection, which under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003955258
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Precontractual investigation and sequential screening
Terstiege, Stefan - 2013
Should contract design induce an agent to conduct a precontractual investigation even though, in any case, the agent will become fully informed after the signing of the contract? This paper shows that imperfect investigations might be encouraged. The result stands in contrast to previous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198969