Showing 1 - 10 of 24
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003391713
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306003
This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an expost outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent's information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without expost outside options, the optimal contract is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333968
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer '€" the seller '€" follows from a non-trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334064
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274805
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer ' the seller ' follows from a non-trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003975228
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008859007
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011365
This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an expost outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent's information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without expost outside options, the optimal contract is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009381855
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009244217