This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers’ motivation is private information....

We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Signaling in both one and two dimensions is considered, where in the latter case firms have an informational...

We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Our model features signaling in both one and two dimensions, where in the latter case firms have an...

In many real-world settings, an action that affects the value of a product or service is self-reported rather than publicly observable. This, in turn introduces the possibility of misrepresentation. In this paper, we propose a theoretical model of self-reporting. A sender chooses an action and...

In this paper the Signalling approach to the explanation of wage differentials is analysed in a critical way. Departing from the classic Spence's model, the article shows how the introduction of inequalities in accessing to education leads to separating equilibria characterised by redistributive...

This research focuses on estimating the signalling role of education on the Russian labour market. Two well-known screening hypotheses are initially considered. According to first of these, education is an ideal filter of persons with low productivity: education does not increase the...

How does information asymmetry between firms regarding the quality (ability) of workers, determine the distribution of workers' qualities in those firms? We build a game theoretic model of information asymmetry between 2 representative firms competing in the labor market for labor inputs. In the...

We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power. We provide a geometric characterization of the sender's attainable payoffs, described by the topological join of the graphs of the sender's interim payoff functions associated with different sender actions. We...

In this paper the Signalling approach to the explanation of wage differentials is analyzed in a critical way. Departing from the classic Spence's model, the article shows how the introduction of inequalities in accessing to education leads to separating equilibria characterized by redistributive...

A pre-condition for employer learning is that signals at labor market entry do not fully reveal graduates' productivity. I model various distinct sources of signal imperfection-such as noise and multi-dimensional types-and characterize their implications for the private return to skill...