We analyze the risk levels chosen by agents who have private information regarding their quality, and whose performance will be judged and rewarded by outsiders. Assume that risk choice is observable. Even risk-neutral agents will choose risk strategically to enhance their expected reputation....

Crowdfunding is a new and popular way of funding innovative products. Despite numerous advantages, there are challenges to this model, chief among them credibly signaling information about product quality to a pool of small, uninformed investors. We explore how an entrepreneur might accomplish...

We analyse a Kyle-type continuous-time market model in which liquidity trading is correlated with a noisy public signal that is released continuously. We show that, in contrast to the previous literature, Kyle's lambda, the price sensitivity to the order flow, can even be nonmonotonic, depending...

In this article, we extend the one-period model of Jain and Mirman (1999) for asset trading with two correlated signals to a two period model. We then prove the existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian linear equilibrium. Finally, we perform comparative statics analysis with respect to Kyle...

We assess the extent to which discretion, unexplained variations in the terms of a loan contract, has varied across time and lending institutions and show that part of this discretion is due to private information that lenders have on their borrowers. We find that discretion is lower for secured...

This paper analyses the equilibrium and welfare properties of an economy characterized by uncertainty and payoff externalities using a general model that nests several applications. Agents receive a private signal and an endogenous public signal, which is a noisy aggregate of individual actions...

This paper analyses the equilibrium and welfare properties of an economy characterised by uncertainty and payoff externalities using a general model that nests several applications. Agents receive a private signal and an endogenous public signal, which is a noisy aggregate of individual actions...

We provide a theoretical rationale for dealer objections to ex-post transparency in corporate bond and other OTC markets: Disclosure of the terms of a transaction conveys information possessed by the dealer about the asset quality and reduces the dealer's rents when she disposes of the inventory...

I study a level-k reasoning equilibrium in an asymmetric information environment populated by informed/uninformed agents and noise speculators. The approach provides a bridge between disclosing information and fractions of market participants, and sheds new light on the effects of information...

We study how signaling affects equilibrium outcomes and welfare in markets with adverse selection. Using data from an online credit market, we estimate a model of borrowers and lenders where low reserve interest rates can signal low default risk. Comparing a market with and without signaling...