Crowdfunding is a new and popular way of funding innovative products. Despite numerous advantages, there are challenges to this model, chief among them credibly signaling information about product quality to a pool of small, uninformed investors. We explore how an entrepreneur might accomplish...

We analyze the risk levels chosen by agents who have private information regarding their quality, and whose performance will be judged and rewarded by outsiders. Assume that risk choice is observable. Even risk-neutral agents will choose risk strategically to enhance their expected reputation....

This paper examines a class of signaling games with multi-dimensional private information to study how the prior, joint distribution of the private information variables affect a signal's effectiveness in revealing information about these variables. To illustrate the general problem investigated...

We study how signaling affects equilibrium outcomes and welfare in markets with adverse selection. Using data from an online credit market, we estimate a model of borrowers and lenders where low reserve interest rates can signal low default risk. Comparing a market with and without signaling...

We analyse a Kyle-type continuous-time market model in which liquidity trading is correlated with a noisy public signal that is released continuously. We show that, in contrast to the previous literature, Kyle's lambda, the price sensitivity to the order flow, can even be nonmonotonic, depending...

This paper examines how multidimensional private information by asset sellers affects market equilibrium. I find that when asset quality is the only source of private information, sellers with high-quality assets signal their quality to buyers through partial retention of assets if and only if...

This paper analyses the equilibrium and welfare properties of an economy characterized by uncertainty and payoff externalities using a general model that nests several applications. Agents receive a private signal and an endogenous public signal, which is a noisy aggregate of individual actions...

This paper analyses the equilibrium and welfare properties of an economy characterised by uncertainty and payoff externalities using a general model that nests several applications. Agents receive a private signal and an endogenous public signal, which is a noisy aggregate of individual actions...

We provide a theoretical rationale for dealer objections to ex-post transparency in corporate bond and other OTC markets: Disclosure of the terms of a transaction conveys information possessed by the dealer about the asset quality and reduces the dealer's rents when she disposes of the inventory...

We provide a theoretical rationale for dealer objections to ex-post transparency in corporate bond and other OTC markets: Disclosure of the terms of a transaction conveys information possessed by the dealer about the asset quality and reduces the dealer's rents when she disposes of the inventory...