We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of...

We study the coevolution of cooperation, preferences and cooperative signals in an environment where individuals engage in a signaling-extended prisoner's dilemma. We identify a new type of evolutionary equilibrium - a transitional equilibrium - which is constituted and stabilized by the dynamic...

We study the coevolution of cooperation, preferences, and cooperative signals in an environment where individuals engage in a signaling-extended prisoner's dilemma. We prove the existence of a cooperative equilibrium constituted by a (set of) limit cycle(s) and stabilized by the dynamic...

This paper examines different Brownian information structures for varying time intervals. We focus on the non-limit case and on the trade-offs between information quantity and quality to efficiently establish incentives. These two dimensions of information tend to complement each other when...

We study the coevolution of cooperation, preferences, and cooperative signals in an environment where individuals engage in a signaling-extended prisoner's dilemma. We prove the existence of a cooperative equilibrium constituted by a (set of) limit cycle(s) and stabilized by the dynamic...

I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players' actions. First, when the long-run player's action can...

This paper studies repeated communication regarding a multidimensional collective decision in a large population. When preferences coincide but beliefs about the consequences of the various decisions diverge, it is shown, under some specific assumptions, that public communication causes the...

We study the dominant separating equilibrium that maximizes the sender's payoff in quadratic signaling games. We relax the common and restrictive belief monotonicity assumption. We introduce a game characteristic called discriminant and show that there exists a linear incentive compatible...

We study a hierarchical Bayesian persuasion game with a sender, a receiver, and several potential intermediaries, generalizing the framework of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). The sender must be persuasive through a hierarchy of intermediaries to reach the final receiver, whose action affects all...

We consider repeated trading by sellers with persistent private information in dynamic lemons markets. We compare the outcomes of a transparent market where past trading prices are public to those of an opaque market, where they are private. We characterize the upper bound of trading surplus in...