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Belief formation in a signalling game without common prior : an experiment
Possajennikov, Alexandre - 2012
Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526
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Voluntary bankruptcy as preemptive persuasion
Dinev, Nikolay - 2017
This paper examines the phenomenon of management-initiated, court-supervised reorganization of companies in U.S. bankruptcy court. The proposed in-court persuasion mechanism reconciles excessive reorganizations of non-viable companies (and subsequent repeat failures) with management-initiated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011779720
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Cheap talk with correlated signals
Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2013
informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326
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Cheap talk with correlated signals
Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2015
informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011774610
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Bayesian Persuasion Mediating Cheap Talk
Sagiev, Erkin - 2020
We study a multi-player model of sequential communication. A receiver obtains information from two sources. The first … modifies the initial information. We prove that Bayesian persuasion does not defy truthful communication in cheap talk, but … preferences of the mediator regarding a cheap-talk partition formed by the sender. Finally, we illustrate our results drawing on a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822471
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Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2016
informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153232
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Signaling without common prior : an experiment
Drouvelis, Michalis; Müller, Wieland; Possajennikov, … - 2009
; experiment ; learning …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003828280
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Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment
Drouvelis, Michalis; Müller, Wieland; Possajennikov, … - 2009
The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender’s type, the long-run behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207945
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Signaling without common prior: An experiment
Drouvelis, Michalis; Müller, Wieland; Possajennikov, Alex - 2009
The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender's type, the long-run behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277488
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Communication games with optional verification
Schopohl, Simon - 2016
We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending a cheap-talk message, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576182