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Communication with multiple senders : an experiment
Vespa, Emanuel; Wilson, Alistair J. - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-36
We implement multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory. While full-information transmission is not theoretically feasible in the standard one-sender-one- dimension model, in this setting with more senders and dimensions, full revelation is generically a robust equilibrium outcome. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011798907
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Voluntary bankruptcy as preemptive persuasion
Dinev, Nikolay - 2017
This paper examines the phenomenon of management-initiated, court-supervised reorganization of companies in U.S. bankruptcy court. The proposed in-court persuasion mechanism reconciles excessive reorganizations of non-viable companies (and subsequent repeat failures) with management-initiated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011779720
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Cheap talk with correlated signals
Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2015
informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011774610
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Optimal information disclosure : a linear programming approach
Kolotilin, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 607-635
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856702
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Cheap talk with correlated signals
Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2013
informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326
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Bayesian Persuasion Mediating Cheap Talk
Sagiev, Erkin - 2020
We study a multi-player model of sequential communication. A receiver obtains information from two sources. The first … modifies the initial information. We prove that Bayesian persuasion does not defy truthful communication in cheap talk, but … preferences of the mediator regarding a cheap-talk partition formed by the sender. Finally, we illustrate our results drawing on a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822471
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Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information
Kosenko, Andrew - 2018
We study a model of communication and Bayesian persuasion between a sender who is privately informed and has state …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912599
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Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
Chand, A.K.S; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2016
informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153232
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Bayesian signaling
Hedlund, Jonas - 2014
This paper introduces private sender information into a sender-receiver game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to fully characterize the set of equilibria robust to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010458265
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Persuasion by dimension reduction
Malamud, Semyon; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2021 - This version: October 17, 2021
How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799529