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Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von (contributor) - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571

I care what you think : social image concerns and the strategic revelation of past pro-social behavior

Siemens, Ferdinand von - In: Journal of the Economic Science Association : a … 6 (2020) 1, pp. 43-56

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012300744

I care what you think : social image concerns and the strategic revelation of past pro-social behavior

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2019

This article studies whether people want to control which information on their own past pro-social behavior is revealed to other people. Participants in an experiment are assigned a color which depends on their own past pro-sociality. They can then spend money to increase or decrease the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011966892