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Signaling, Shame, and Silence in Social Learning
Chandrasekhar, Arun G.; Golub, Benjamin; Yang, He - 2019
We examine how a social stigma of seeking information can inhibit learning. Consider a Seeker of uncertain ability who …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014110910
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Signaling, Shame, and Silence in Social Learning
Chandrasekhar, Arun G. - 2018
We examine how a social stigma of seeking information can inhibit learning. Consider a Seeker of uncertain ability who …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909127
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An experiment on social mislearning
Eyster, Erik; Rabin, Matthew; Weizsäcker, Georg - 2018
We investigate experimentally whether social learners appreciate the redundancy of information conveyed by their observed predecessors' actions. Each participant observes a private signal and enters an estimate of the sum of all earlier-moving participants' signals plus her own. In a first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899219
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Signaling, Shame, and Silence in Social Learning
Chandrasekhar, Arun G. - 2018
We examine how a social stigma of seeking information can inhibit learning. Consider a Seeker of uncertain ability who …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012480821
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Teaching by example and induced beliefs in a model of cultural transmission
Adriani, Fabrizio; Matheson, Jesse A.; Sonderegger, Silvia - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 145 (2018), pp. 511-529
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011941784
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Voting as a Signaling Device
Aytimur, R. Emre - 2012
In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111989
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Voting as a signaling device
Aytimur, R. Emre; Boukouras, Aristotelis; Schwager, Robert - 2012
In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009672366
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Voting as a signaling device
Aytimur, R. Emre; Boukouras, Aristotelis; Schwager, Robert - 2012
In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009489028
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Toward a Behavioral Theory of Real Options : Noisy Signals, Bias, and Learning
Posen, Hart E. - 2020
values (prospective uncertainty) with feedback learning theory that considers uncertain current asset values (contemporaneous …We develop a behavioral theory of real options that relaxes the informational and behavioral assumptions underlying … applications of financial options theory to real assets. To do so, we augment real option theory's focus on uncertain future asset …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856401
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Learning Before Trading : On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information
Ravid, Doron - 2020
signal is smooth and increasing in informativeness. We characterize the set of equilibria when learning is free and show that … they are strongly Pareto ranked. Our main result is that, when learning is costly but the cost of information goes to zero …, equilibria converge to the worst free-learning equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850392