Repeated games tend to have large sets of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper shows that for all of these neutrally stable strategies there is a stepping...

Repeated games tend to have large sets of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper shows that for all of these neutrally stable strategies there is a stepping...

We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma with implementation errors, and look at the resulting population dynamics, both analytically and with simulations. We show that with implementation errors, pure equilibrium strategies represented by finite state automata exhibit a structure that we...

We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma with implementation errors, and look at the resulting population dynamics, both analytically and with simulations. We show that with implementation errors, pure equilibrium strategies represented by finite state automata exhibit a structure that we...