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This paper analyzes a dynamic relational contract for employees with reciprocal preferences. I develop a tractable model to investigate how “direct” performance-pay (promising a bonus in exchange for effort) and generous upfront wages (which activate the norm of reciprocity) interact over...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012241077
This paper explores how a relational contract establishes a norm of reciprocity and how such a norm shapes the provision of informal incentives. Developing a model of a long-term employment relationship, I show that generous upfront wages that activate the norm of reciprocity are more important...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002999
This paper explores the optimal provision of dynamic incentives for employees with reciprocal preferences. Building on the presumption that a relational contract can establish a norm of reciprocity, I show that generous upfront wages that activate an employee’s reciprocal preferences are more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126237
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014392984
This paper explores how a relational contract establishes a norm of reciprocity and how such a norm shapes the provision of informal incentives. Developing a model of a long-term employment relationship, I show that generous upfront wages that activate the norm of reciprocity are more important...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870637
This paper analyzes a dynamic relational contract for employees with reciprocal preferences. I develop a tractable model to investigate how "direct" performance-pay (promising a bonus in exchange for effort) and generous upfront wages (which activate the norm of reciprocity) interact over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828785
This paper analyzes a dynamic relational contract for employees with reciprocal preferences. I develop a tractable model to investigate how "direct" performance-pay (promising a bonus in exchange for effort) and generous upfront wages (which activate the norm of reciprocity) interact over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012254054
We explore how inherent preferences for reciprocity and repeated interaction interact in an optimal incentive system. Developing a theoretical model of a long-term employment relationship, we first show that reciprocal preferences are more important when an employee is close to retirement. At...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718616