theoretical and empirical justification. We show in a laboratory experiment using a standard corruption game that introducing the …The "Four-Eyes-Principle" is considered as one of the most potent measures against corruption although it lacks both …

This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer …. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other …, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party. Our data show that the …

In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement … Official A at almost all individual detection levels. This 'legitimacy' effect may help explain why anti-corruption policies …

-group favouritism ; parochialism ; field experiment ; social preferences ; microcredit …

provision of globally important public goods like the global climate. -- Experiment ; Groups ; Public good ; Spillover Game …

This article analyzes how the anticipation of peer-punishment affects cooperativeness in the provision of public goods …. We demonstrate, firstly, that the social environment is a determinant of how the threat of peer-punishment influences … especially the case for individuals who were initially categorized as freeriders. Secondly, anticipation of peer-punishment …