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Eliaz (2004) has established a "meta-theorem" for preference aggregation which implies both Arrow's Theorem (1963) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (1973, 1975). This theorem shows that the driving force behind impossibility theorems in preference aggregation is the mutual exclusiveness of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003818219
This paper studies collective decision making with regard to convex risk measures: It addresses the question whether there exist nondictatorial aggregation functions of convex risk measures satisfying Arrow-type rationality axioms (weak universality, systematicity, Pareto principle). Herein,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008735707
It is well known that the literature on judgment aggregation inherits the impossibility results from the aggregation of preferences that it generalises. This is due to the fact that the typical judgment aggregation problem induces an ultrafilter on the the set of individuals, as was shown in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008736325
This article proves a very general version of the Kirman-Sondermann [Journal of Economic Theory, 5(2):267-277, 1972] correspondence by extending the methodology of Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 24(3):217-237, 1995]. The paper first proposes a unified framework...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921381
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This paper studies the nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams, satisfying the efficiency principle known as Monotonicity and the consequentialist equity principle known as Strong Equity. It provides a complete characterization of domain sets for which there exists such a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013062883
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Harsanyi (1997) argues that, for normative issues, informed preferences should be used, instead of actual preferences or happiness (or welfare). Following his argument allowing him to move from actual to informed preferences to its logical conclusion forces us to use happiness instead. Where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215102