Fried (in Public Choise, this issue, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2013</CitationRef>) claims that Quesada (in Public Choise 130:395–400, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">2007</CitationRef>) is wrong in showing that the dictator in a dictatorial social welfare function does not necessarily enjoy absolute decision power. This reply revisits, and illustrates by means of an example,...</citationref></citationref>

The problem of aggregating preferences over two alternatives is considered. Three axioms are postulated: unanimity, reducibility (two divergent preferences can be replaced by their aggregation), and anonymity. It is shown that only twelve aggregation rules satisfy the three axioms: the majority...

Two axioms are shown to characterize the relative majority rule when preferences are defined over two alternatives. According to one axiom, if all the individuals in a group are indifferent, then the associated group preference is indifference. The second axiom states that a group S prefers...