We consider the problem of fairly reallocating the individual endowments of a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences. We provide a new concept of fairness, called position-wise envy-freeness, that is compatible with individual rationality. This new concept requires...

We propose generalized versions of strong equity and Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. We study the existence and the real valued representation of social welfare relations satisfying these two generalized equity principles. Our results characterize the restrictions on one period utility domains...

There exists a utilitarian tradition a la Sidgwick of treating equal generations equally in the form of anonymity. Diamond showed that no social evaluation ordering over infinite utility streams satisfying the Pareto principle, Sidgwick's equity principle, and the axiom of continuity exists. We...

Climate change is an externality since those who emit greenhouse gases do not pay the long-term negative consequences of their emissions. In view of the resulting inefficiency, it has been claimed that climate policies can be evaluated by the Pareto principle. However, climate policies lead to...

The Pareto principle has great intuitive appeal, but poses perplexities on closer examination. What exactly do we mean by “preferences”? Should the principle apply ex post or ex ante? Does it uphold individual autonomy, individual welfare, or both? This essay argues that the Pareto principle...

A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a nonbinary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals’ preferences concern only their own personal...

We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyiʼs impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional axiom is necessary and sufficient for the observer to exhibit...

This paper investigates ethical aggregation of infinite utility streams by representable social welfare relations. We prove that the Hammond Equity postulate and other variations of it like the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle are incompatible with positive responsiveness to welfare...

This paper concerns ethical aggregation of infinite utility streams. Position i is typically interpreted as the endowment of generation i. We analyze the broad question: In order for the social welfare to increase, the interest of how many generations can be respected if we intend to be...

We provide an axiomatization of generalized utilitarian social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem. To do this, we reformulate Harsanyi's problem such that lotteries over identity (accidents of birth) and lotteries over outcomes (life chances) are...