rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …

The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games, which admit no equilibrium … (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1977, 1999) but …-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches in full implementation theory. We show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and …

(θ). We find that r -monotonicity is a necessary condition for the rationalizable implementation of a SCC. When there are at … implementation. Finally, we show that a SCC which is never single-valued is rationalizably implementable if and only if it satisfies …