We develop a sovereign debt model with offcial and private creditors where default risk depends on both the level and the composition of liabilities. Higher exposure to offcial lenders improves incentives to repay but carries extra costs, such as reduced ex-post flexibility. The model implies...

Motivated by the recent increase in domestic banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign debt (i.e., home bias) in the European periphery, this paper analyzes implications of banks’ home bias for the sovereign’s debt sustainability. The main findings, based on a sample of advanced...

This paper constructs a new measure of currency mismatch in the banking sector that controls for bank lending to unhedged borrowers. This measure explicitly takes into account the indirect exchange rate risk that banks undertake when they lend to borrowers that will not be able to repay in the...

We develop a sovereign debt model with offcial and private creditors where default risk depends on both the level and the composition of liabilities. Higher exposure to offcial lenders improves incentives to repay but carries extra costs, such as reduced ex-post flexibility. The model implies...

We develop a sovereign debt model with official and private creditors where default risk depends on both the level and the composition of liabilities. Higher exposure to official lenders improves incentives to repay but carries extra costs, such as reduced ex-post flexibility. The model implies...