Pension systems fight myopia and reduce old-age poverty. Our simple model introduces heterogeneous wages, flexible labor supply, progressive personal income tax and pension credit. The socially optimal transfer system is close to the means-tested one proposed by Feldstein (1987). -- myopia ;...

We analyze the impact of (exogenous) tax morale on the optimal design of progressive income taxation. In our model, only universal basic income (transfer) is financed from a linear income tax and the financing of public goods is neglected. Each individual supplies labor and (un)declares earning,...

The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age...

We analyze the impact of (exogenous) tax morale on the optimal design of progressive income taxation. In our model, only universal basic income (transfer) is financed from a linear income tax and the financing of public goods is neglected. Each individual supplies labor and (un)declares earning,...

Pension systems fight myopia and reduce old-age poverty. Our simple model introduces heterogeneous wages, flexible labor supply, progressive personal income tax and pension credit. The socially optimal transfer system is close to the means-tested one proposed by Feldstein (1987).

The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age...