We analyze the evolution of fashion based on a network game model. Each agent in this model is either a conformist or a rebel. A conformist prefers to take the action most common among her neighboring agents, whereas a rebel prefers the opposite. When there is only one type of agent, the model...

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address...

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address...

The novelty of our model is to combine models of collective action on networks with models of social learning. Agents are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to adopt a new behavior or technology or stay with the default...

In a setting where an infinite population of players interact locally and repeatedly, we study the impacts of payoff structures and network structures on contagion of a convention. For the "bilingual game", where each player chooses one of two conventions or adopts both (i.e., chooses the...

This paper studies the diffusion of products and behaviour with coordination effects through social networks when agents are myopic best responders. We develop a new network measure, the contagion threshold, that determines when a p-dominant action – an action that is a best response when...

e study whether maximum efficiency can be obtained in a stochastic learning model where players can actively form links with a limited number of peers to play a size-dependent minimum-effort game. The long-run equilibrium is contingent on the linking constraint and the marginal payoff from...

The novelty of our model is to combine models of collective action on networks with models of social learning. Agents are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to adopt a new behavior or technology or stay with the default...

We analyze a game in which players with unique information are arranged in a hierarchy. In the lowest layer each player can decide in each of several rounds either to pass the information to his successor or to hold. While passing generates an immediate payoff according to the value of...

We choose between alternatives without being fully informed about the rewards from different courses of action. In making our decisions, we use our own past experience and the experience of others. So the ways in which we interact - our social network - can influence our choices. These choices...