Management scholars have long stressed the importance of evolutionary processses for inter-firm cooperation but have mostly missed the promising opportunity to incorporate ideas from evolutionary theories into the analysis of collaborative arrangements. In this paper, we first present three...

In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoffis exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenouslydetermined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier resultsfor two-person generosity games show that participants seem to caremore for eciency than for equity....

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologiesto catch …sh. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery;the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches.Strategic interaction in one ‘objective’resource game may induceseveral ‘subjective’...

We introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilitiesdepend on the history of the play, i.e., the players’past action choices.To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward crite-rion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewardswhich can be...

This lecture is a brief overview of an evolutionary theory of fairness. The ideasare fleshed out in a book Natural Justice, which is itself a condensed versionof an earlier two-volume book Game Theory and the Social Contract (Binmore[14, 12, 13])...