This paper presents an experimental examination of the Falkinger (1996) mechanism for overcoming the free-rider problem. The basic idea of the mechanism is that deviations from the mean contribution to the public good are taxed and subsidized. The mechanism has attractive properties because (i)...

This paper presents an experimental examination of the Falkinger (1996) mechanism for overcoming the free-rider problem. The basic idea of the mechanism is that deviations from the mean contribution to the public good are taxed and subsidized. The mechanism has attractive properties because (i)...

We use a simple balanced budget contest to collect taxes on a private good in order to finance a pure public good. We show that-with an appropriately chosen structure of winning probabilities-this contest can provide the public good efficiently and without distorting private consumption. We...

Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only...