Showing 1 - 10 of 13
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003248760
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players' benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003624217
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players’ benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009244226
In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405384
In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public good game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes and a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). The game is implemented either as a Single- or a Multi-Phase Game. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485300
According to the model of HOEL (1991), a unilateral emissions abatement of a global pollutant leads to lower aggregated emissions in a game with a simultaneous decision protocol. Our experiment tests the Hoel model and examines the question of whether a leader can induce additional abatement of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402574
According to the model of HOEL (1991), a unilateral emissions abatement of a global pollutant leads to lower aggregated emissions in a game with a simultaneous decision protocol. Our experiment tests the Hoel model and examines the question of whether a leader can induce additional abatement of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002107319
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001825373
In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048145