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L' origine de la théorie financière : une réévaluation de l'apport de Loius Bachelier
Jovanovic, Franck - In: Revue d'économie politique 110 (2000) 3, pp. 395-418
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001498283
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Vademecum zu dem Klassiker der Spieltheorie
Grüske, Karl-Dieter (contributor);  … - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001586181
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Thomas Schelling und die Theorie der Self-Command
Ortmann, Andreas; Weber, Angelika - In: Thomas Schellings strategische Ökonomik, (pp. 121-153). 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003638338
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The tricks of the (no-)trade (theorem)
Sent, Esther-Mirjam - In: Agreement on demand : consumer theory in the twentieth …, (pp. 305-321). 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003515695
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Rationality in economics : constructivist and ecological forms
Smith, Vernon L. - 2008 - 1. publ.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003408073
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Repeated games with asymmetric information modeling financial markets with two risky assets
Kreps, Victoria; Domanskij, Victor - In: RAIRO / Operations research 47 (2013) 3, pp. 251-272
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010492811
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Stopping games with randomized strategies
Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001396738
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The maxim criterion and randomized behaviour reconsidered
Ryan, Matthew Joseph - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001404185
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Stability, fairness and random walks in the bargaining problem
Kapeller, Jakob; Steinerberger, Stefan - 2017
We study the classical bargaining problem and its two canonical solutions, (Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky), from a novel point of view: we ask for stability of the solution if both players are able distort the underlying bargaining process by reference to a third party (e.g. a court). By exploring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011714701
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Stability, fairness and random walks in the bargaining problem
Kapeller, Jakob; Steinerberger, Stefan - 2017
We study the classical bargaining problem and its two canonical solutions, (Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky), from a novel point of view: we ask for stability of the solution if both players are able distort the underlying bargaining process by reference to a third party (e.g. a court). By exploring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781098