This paper is based on Ille, 2013. Both papers analyze the same models, but in contrast, this paper does not provide an analytical solution but rather resorts to simulations. This allows the reader, who is familiar with the former article, to retrace the results more thoroughly and without the...

We study a random effects censored regression model in the context of repeated games. Introducing a feedback variable into the model leads to violation of the strict exogeneity assumption, thus rendering the random effects estimator inconsistent. Using the example of contributions to a public...

The paper studies the link between corruption and social capital (measured as trust), using data from a lab experiment. Subjects play either a harassment bribery game or a strategically identical but differently framed ultimatum game, followed by a trust game. In a second experiment, we elicit...

We study the impact of tipping in a service facility on the server's tipping wage, in the presence of an endogenously formed social norm. The problem is modeled as a two-stage tipping game: In the first stage, delay-sensitive customers arrive at an M/M/1 facility and decide whether to join or...

Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation in social networks. Although it is known that two of the major mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation are spatial selection and reputation-based reciprocity, theoretical...