Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 14,431
Cover Image
Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design
Celik, Gorkem; Peters, Michael - In: The Canadian journal of economics 49 (2016) 1, pp. 374-411
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597609
Cover Image
A simple supermodular mechanism that implements Lindahl allocations
Van Essen, Matthew - In: Journal of public economic theory 15 (2013) 3, pp. 363-377
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785575
Cover Image
A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
Van Essen, Matthew - In: Social choice and welfare 43 (2014) 2, pp. 309-327
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395054
Cover Image
Bartering games in the Kolm triangle
Van Essen, Matthew - In: Journal of public economic theory 17 (2015) 3, pp. 297-310
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350170
Cover Image
Robust weak dominance implementation : solving the King Solomon dilemma
Yang, Chun-lei - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000918319
Cover Image
Efficient allocation of an indivisible good : a mechanism design problem under uncertainty
Yang, Chun-lei - In: Firms, markets and contracts : contributions to …, (pp. 263-272). 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001293201
Cover Image
Incomplete record-keeping and optimal payment arrangements
Kocherlakota, Narayana Rao - In: Journal of economic theory 81 (1998) 2, pp. 272-289
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001338239
Cover Image
Unimprovable allocations economies with incomplete information
Krasa, Stefan - In: Journal of economic theory 87 (1999) 1, pp. 144-168
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001403523
Cover Image
Incentives for allocating public goods under incomplete information
Klepper, Gernot - 1983
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001750829
Cover Image
Beliefs, payoffs, information : on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2012 - First version: December 1, 2008, This version: March 23, 2012
Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown that, in auctions with incomplete information about payoffs, full surplus extraction is only possible if agents’ beliefs about other agents are fully informative about their own payoff parameters. They argue that the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010230371