This paper analyzes the influence of Information structure on the process of knowledge accumulation in a differential game of duopolistic R&D competition. By comparing open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria, representing imperfect and perfect information structures, we show that in the feedback...

In case of multiple creditors a coordination problem can arise when the borrowingfirm runs into financial distress. Even if the project's value at maturity is enoughto pay all creditors in full, some creditors may be tempted to foreclose on theirloans. We develop a model of creditor coordination...

Based on an extended game-theoretic innovation-race model, we derive some Schumpeterian hypotheses of the impact of technological rivalry, market power, technological opportunities and market size on the timing of product and process innovations. Using innovation data at the firm level in the...

We show that concealing cost information is a dominant strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies. This result enables us to endogenize the number of firms in a market in terms of market size, entry costs, and unit cost uncertainty.

Der Beitrag sollte verdeutlichen, dass sich seit den Pioniermodellen mit unvollständiger Information mittlerweile eine recht heterogene Klasse von Ansätzen etabliert hat, die sich unter alternativen Grundannahmen mit der Frage auseinandersetzen, ob Unternehmen angesichts diverser...

This paper analyzes the influence of Information structure on the process of knowledge accumulation in a differential game of duopolistic R&D competition. By comparing open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria, representing imperfect and perfect information structures, we show that in the feedback...