In the last years, many contributions have been exploring population learning in economies where myopic agents play bilateral games and are allowed to repeatedly choose their pure strategies in the game and, possibly, their opponents in the game. These models explore bilateral stage-games...

This paper yields sufficient conditions for Pareto inoptimality of controls forming Nash equilibria in differential games. In Appendix a result on existence of open loop Nash equilibria is added.

This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of the...

The famous game of two cars is a pursuit-evasion dynamic game. In theextended version presented here, a correct driver (evader) on a freeway detectsa wrong-way driver (pursuer in a worst case scenario), i.e., a car driving on thewrong lanes of the road or in the wrong direction. The correct...

This paper examines how cooperation in an insurance game depends on risk preferences and the riskiness of income. It considers a dynamic game where commitment is limited, and characterizes the level of cooperation as measured by the reciprocal of the discount factor above which perfect risk...