We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking option. We use the strategy method to identify behavioural ‘types', and thus distinguish ‘conformists' from...

We set up an experimental coordination game among bank depositors à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We elicit subjects' financial literacy and study the impact of revealing this information on the coordination problem typical of this game with multiple equilibria. We find that when no information...

We summarise our two sets of controlled experiments designed to see if single-sex classes within coeducational environments modify students’ risk-taking attitudes. In Booth and Nolen (2012b), subjects are in years 10 and 11, while in Booth, Cardona-Sosa and Nolen (2014), they are first-year...

It is commonly assumed that friendship should generally benefit agents' ability to tacitly coordinate with others. However, this has never been tested on two "opposite poles" of coordination, namely, games of strategic complements and substitutes. We present an experimental study in which...

We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking...

This paper reports 45 laboratory duopoly markets that examine the importance of information sharing in facilitating tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. Sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared information when possible to reduce their demand uncertainty,...

This paper reports 45 laboratory duopoly markets that examine the importance of information sharing in facilitating tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. Sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared information when possible to reduce their demand uncertainty,...