Bertrand competition under decreasing returns involves a wide interval of pure strategy equilibrium prices. We first present results of experiments in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. Less collusion with more firms leads to lower average prices....

Bertrand competition under decreasing returns involves a wide interval of pure strategy equilibrium prices. We first present results of experiments in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. Less collusion with more firms leads to lower average prices....

In the context of a duopoly market, firms can learn about unobservable demand from two sources: conducting market research, and spying on their competitor's market research results. In the unique linear equilibrium firms pick an action which is a weighted average of the market research signal...

Recent experimental simulations have shown that autonomous pricing algorithms are able to learn collusive behavior and thus charge supra-competitive prices without being explicitly programmed to do so. These simulations assume, however, that both firms employ the identical price-setting...

In this paper, we study an imperfect monitoring model of duopoly under similar settings as in Green and Porter (1984), but here firms do not know the demand parameters and learn about them over time through the price signals. We investigate how a deviation from rational expectations affects the...

This paper studies the consequence of an imprecise recall of the price by the consumers in the Bertrand price competition model for a homogeneous good. It is shown that firms can exploit this weakness and charge prices above the competitive price. This markup increases for rougher recall of the...

We study voluntary disclosure strategies in leader-follower games where firms choose real actions sequentially after simultaneously disclosing information. We show that the leader incurs an endogenous consistency cost when withholding information because it must choose a suboptimal real action...

The widespread use of market-making algorithms in electronic over-the-counter markets may give rise to unexpected effects resulting from the autonomous learning dynamics of these algorithms. In particular the possibility of `tacit collusion' among market makers has increasingly received...

We generalize Hotelling’s model of spatial competition with more than two firms in a two-dimensional space. Firms choose both price and location to maximize profits. The principle of minimum differentiation does not hold in general. Local duopolies emerge from the interaction between firms....