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Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks
Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019
of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351
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Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns
Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017
counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886
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One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773
A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276
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Asymmetric power and market failure : power hazard in exchange
Ertürk, Korkut A. - 2016
In simple textbook treatment of bilateral exchange traders end up on the contract curve such that the trading surplus is maximized regardless of any asymmetric bargaining power they might have. However, that need not be true when the terms of exchange are determined by uncooperative bargaining,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435708
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Bargaining in a long-term relationship and the Rubinstein solution
Stähler, Frank - 1996
In a recent paper, Muthoo (1995) discusses whether the Rubinstein solution carries over on repeated bargaining situations. He concludes that stationary equilibria for such a repeated bargaining game do not imply the Rubinstein solution and that several non-stationary equilibria may exist. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275624
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Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 62 (2016) 6, pp. 1645-1667
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011502533
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Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014
It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442390
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Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014
It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011808006
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Observability of partners' past play and cooperation : experimental evidence
Kamei, Kenju; Kobayashi, Hajime; Tse, Tiffany Tsz Kwan - 2021
The observability of partners' past play is known to theoretically improve cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game under random matching. This paper presents evidence from an incentivized experiment that reputational information per se may not improve cooperation. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012665559
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Splitting a Pie : Mixed Strategies in Bargaining Under Complete Information
Connell, Christopher - 2019
We characterize the mixed-strategy equilibria for the bargaining game in which two players simultaneously bid for a share of a pie and receive shares proportional to their bids, or zero if the bids sum to more than 100%. Of particular interest is the symmetric equilibrium in which each player's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012858781