We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a “one principal-two agent” context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedbackmechanisms and...

FeedbackWe theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by different performance technologies. We consider a setting where the principal can provide truthful information on agents’ performances or strategically withhold feedback. We find...

We introduce a "nestedness" relation for a general class of sender-receiver games and compare equilibrium properties, in particular the amount of information transmitted, across games that are nested. Roughly, game B is nested in game A if the players’s optimal actions are closer in game B. We...

We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...

We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...

Debriefing is an important phase in using simulation games. Participants are invited to make a connection between experiences gained from playing the game and experiences in real-life situations. Thus, debriefing is the phase meant to encourage learning fromthe simulation game. Although design...

The paper provides a micro-founded differentiated duopoly illustration of a beauty contest, in which the relative weight put on the competition motive of the payoffs is not exogenous but may be manipulated by the players. The conflict between the competition and the fundamental motives, already...

We consider an incomplete contracting model in which the decision process consists of the project choice and execution effort. Each party has an imperfectly informative private signal on the promising project and successful execution requires the agent's effort. Revelation of the principal's...

This paper delves into the effects that strategic representations have on firm performance. It does so in four ways. First, it describes different types of representations—internal, external, and distributed—and it points to their pervasiveness in strategy. Second, it presents a framework to...

I develop a formal model of political campaigns in which candidates choose how to distribute their resources over two different policy issues. I assume that campaigning on an issue has two simultaneous effects, both rooted in social and cognitive psychology: It increases the perceived quality of...