We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects is …

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects is …

Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71 …, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between … results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be 'too dense' in a well …

-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic … games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an … element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions …

the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable …

the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable …

the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable …

-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic … games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an … element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions …

the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable …