Similar Search Results

Optimal contracts under imperfect enforcement revisited

Hvide, Hans K. (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003087798

Delay in joint projects

Hvide, Hans K. - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000951063

Er åpen kunnskap nødvendig for koordinert handling?

Hvide, Hans K. - In: Norsk økonomisk tidsskrift 113 (1999) 1, pp. 71-84

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001399728

Risk taking in selection contests

Hvide, Hans K.; Kristiansen, Eirik G. - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001364508

Risk taking in selection contests

Hvide, Hans K.; Kristiansen, Eirik G. - In: Games and economic behavior 42 (2003) 1, pp. 172-179

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001753160

Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

Hvide, Hans K.; Leite, Tore - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 44 (2010) 1, pp. 149-165

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003971923

Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

Hvide, Hans K.; Leite, Tore - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003413479

Capital structure under costly enforcement

Hvide, Hans K.; Leite, Tore - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 110 (2008) 3, pp. 543-565

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003761405

Risk Taking in Selection Contests

Hvide, Hans K.; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard - 2006

We study a tournament/contest where the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The degree to which the most able contestants win (selection efficiency) is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014042980