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Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 2004
We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293711
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Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences
Engelmann, Dirk; Grimm, Veronika - 2008
We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299751
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Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core
Kóczy, László Á. - 2012
We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core, a generalisation of the core to such games. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494524
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Auctioning and selling positions : a non-cooperative approach to queuing conflicts
Brink, René van den; Chun, Youngsub; Ju, Yuan - 2014
Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010238945
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Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: May 2016
rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011483605
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On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game
Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016
interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412680
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Agendas in legislative decision-making
Horan, Sean - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 1, pp. 235-274
Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415641
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Decentralized task coordination
Gudmundsson, Jens; Hougaard, Jens Leth; Platz, Trine Tornøe - 2020
We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012299210
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Supermodular mechanism design
Mathevet, Laurent A. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 5 (2010) 3, pp. 403-443
equilibrium. Finally, I provide a revelation principle for supermodular implementation in environments with general preferences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695244
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Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 609-661
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689095