We develop a model of parallel contests, asymmetric in quantity of homogeneous prizes open to contest, with a finite number of homogeneous risk-neutral bidders assumed to have a linear effort-cost function. We show that at equilibrium the expected effort per capita in the larger contest is...

We take a real analysis approach to characterize the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium (SMSE) of rent-seeking contests for any intermediate value of the decisiveness parameter, allowing for both the ratio-form and the difference-form of contest success functions (CSF) that are axiomatized in...

We characterize the equilibrium set of the n-player Hirshleifer contest with homogeneous valuations. A symmetric equilibrium always exists. It necessarily corresponds to multilateral peace for sufficient noise and uses finite-support randomized strategies otherwise. Asymmetric equilibria are...

The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the...

We study a model of two parallel contests asymmetric in the prize with multiple types of risk-neutral players. Disclosing or hiding the realized number of players in any contest is shown to be irrelevant. We observe a quasi-sorting equilibrium wherein the most competitive players tend to enter...

We characterize the equilibrium set of the n-player Hirshleifer contest with homogeneous valuations. A symmetric equilibrium always exists. It necessarily corresponds to multilateral peace for sufficient noise and uses finite-support randomized strategies otherwise. Asymmetric equilibria are...