Various approaches used in Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) to model endogenously determined interactions between agents are discussed. This concerns models in which agents not only (learn how to) play some (market or other) game, but also (learn to) decide with whom to do that (or not).

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the...

In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the...

This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is to identify a key statistic of contagious punishment that, used together with a recursive formulation, generates tractable closed-form expressions for continuation payoffs, off equilibrium. This...

Today, debt stabilization in an uncertain environment is an important issue. In particular, the question how fiscal and monetary authorities should deal with this uncertainty is very important. Especially for some developing countries such as Iran, in which on average 60 percent of government...

We consider the Nash equilibrium existence problem for Cournotian games and we provide two results for it. The first is compatible with utility functions that are discontinuous at the origin, but requires the nonemptiness of best-replies at the origin (and in some sense is known); the second...

The paper presents a model of world economy with two countries where one of them dubbed home sells the exhaustible resource to final producers in both countries, which compete at the final goods market. The interaction between final producers is reached via the sticky price mechanics, whereas...

This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game theory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, a condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem--limited arbitrage--is the same as the condition which is...

Various approaches used in Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) to model endogenously determined interactions between agents are discussed. This concerns models in which agents not only (learn how to) play some (market or other) game, but also (learn to) decide with whom to do that (or not).

We study the inverse power index problem for weighted voting games: the problem of finding a weighted voting game in which the power of the players is as close as possible to a certain target distribution. Our goal is to find algorithms that solve this problem exactly. Thereto, we study various...