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In this working paper we report on two trust games: a BDM-like game which is interpreted through its use of the possibly suggestive words "show up fee," "sends," "tripled," "send back"; and an uninterpreted spatial game that does not use these words suggestive or not. In the spatial game we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009534879
In this working paper we report on two trust games: a BDM-like game which is interpreted through its use of the possibly suggestive words “show up fee,” “sends,” “tripled,” “send back”; and an uninterpreted spatial game that does not use these words suggestive or not. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014173914
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The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731
We introduce opportunities for pre-play communication and to enter binding or non-binding contracts in trust games, and find (a) communication increases trusting and trustworthiness, (b) contracts are unnecessary for trusting and trustworthy behaviors and are eschewed by many players, (c) more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318895
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We use a two-phase experimental design to study how systematically manipulated beliefs about trust and trustworthiness can promote or deter cooperation. We use decisions in an initially played trust game to create five environments that differ in the information subjects have about the relative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011986595
Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism in economic and social interactions. But it is often unclear what would motivate an agent to report another’s behavior when the pool of potential partners is large and it is easy enough for an aggrieved player to move on. We argue that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333021
Recent experimental studies question whether societies can selfgovern social dilemmas with the help of decentralized punishment opportunities. One important challenge for the mechanism is imperfect information about cooperative behavior. It has been shown that imperfect information increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012006889