We examine the formation of hub-and-spoke and multilateral green technology international agreements. Green R&D provision produces two types of positive externalities, a global public good (i.e., reduction of carbon dioxide emissions) and spillovers in technology agreements. We utilize the...

The Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (PCPN) concept is extended to allow for the emergence of overlapping coalitions in equilibrium. We apply the extended concept to study the efficiency and stability properties of environmental agreements to control emissions of correlated continental...

This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emissions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists. We determine the influence of lobby-groups on...

The paper explores the prospects for international environmental cooperation in a context of limited enforcement, if we allow for side-payments between countries and sequential moves in the implementation of the agreement. The framework of the analysis is a static model of heterogenous countries...

The paper analyzes international environmental agreements that incorporate transfers from a group of industrialized countries to developing countries in a situation of asymmetric information. The framework of the analysis is a static model of transboundary pollution in which information on...

The paper explores the prospects for international environmental cooperation in a context of limited enforcement, if we allow for side-payments between countries and sequential moves in the implementation of the agreement. The framework of the analysis is a static model of heterogenous countries...

We examine how the voluntary participation decision in international environmental negotiations affects negotiation outcomes when every country is a federation. Each country consists of two autonomous regions: one is a polluter region and the other is a nonpolluter region. In the model, each...

We examine the voluntary participation problem in negotiations on providing public goods. In contrast to earlier studies, negotiation is followed by renegotiation in our model. First, players decide whether to participate in a negotiation, and the participants produce a public good. The...

First, the paper lays out the fun-damental assumptions underlying the game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarises important findings which help to explain the difficulties of co-operation and discusses remedies. Chapter 3 looks at measures to avoid...

Many researchers have found game theory a useful method for analyzing internationalenvironmental problems. However, game theory has been criticized for being too theoretical,abstracting from too many practical problems and being based on very specific assumptions.This article tries to qualify...