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Distribution-Dependent Value of Money : A Coalition-Proof Approach to Monetary Equilibrium

Kim, Byoung-Ki; Kwon, Ohik; Lee, Suk won - 2021

We present a simple, finite-state search model to understand how the cross-sectional distribution of money affects its … value. We first document a network effect: the value of a given unit of money is higher when its distribution is even …. This approach is designed to be especially pertinent in the context of private issuance of money, in particular …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013211196

Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the optimality of cutoff mechanisms

Dworczak, Piotr - 2016

I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063

Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the impossibility of pure information intermediation

Dworczak, Piotr - 2016

A mediator, with no prior information and no control over the market protocol, attempts to redesign the information structure in the market by running an information intermediation mechanism with transfers that first elicits information from an agent, and then discloses information to another...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865067

Limited higher order beliefs and the welfare effects of public information

Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - 2013

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009787097

Persuasion by dimension reduction

Malamud, Semyon; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2021 - This version: October 17, 2021

How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799529

Information Design, Signaling, and Central Bank Transparency

Tamura, Wataru - 2018

This study examines monetary policy and central bank communication when a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information. A novel feature is that the central bank ex ante determines how much information it acquires and how much of this information it releases to the public....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012930476

Optimal transport of information

Malamud, Semyon; Cieślak, Anna; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2021 - This version: March 3, 2021

We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is always given by a partition. Second, we take the limit of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012487719

Central bank reputation, cheap talk and transparency as substitutes for commitment : experimental evidence

Duffy, John; Heinemann, Frank - 2016 - This Draft: 2 December 2016

We implement a repeated version of the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game in the laboratory and ask whether reputation serves as a substitute for commitment, enabling the central bank to achieve the efficient Ramsey equilibrium and avoid the inefficient, time-inconsistent one-shot Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572114

One Truth and a Thousand Lies : Focal Points in Mechanism Design

Bochet, Olivier - 2017

Truthtelling is often viewed as focal in direct mechanisms. We introduce two new notions of robust implementation based on the premise that society may be composed of "primitive'' agents who, whenever confronted with a strategy profile, anchor to truthtelling and make a limited number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951989

A principal-agent model of sequential testing

Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas Jóver - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 425-463

This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a dynamic information acquisition process. In every period, the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Each signal may or may not provide definitive evidence in favor of the good state. Neither...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689319

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