of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms … bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the …

-price auction. Before the contest, a fixed number of innovators is selected in an entry auction, in order to address the adverse …

auction works as predicted. In each treatment, the seller's actual revenue is significantly higher than the equilibrium …

show that the complementarity result still holds, yet the seller now fully reveals the popular product attributes in the …

selective update of some of the developments and applications of auction theory in the two decades since Wilson (1992) wrote the …

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

, deals with bidders' anticipated regrets from winning and from losing the auction. It exploits the stochastic properties of … the auction format and rationalizes: (i) Nash equilibrium bidding, (ii) (non-)monotone overbidding and (iii) fully cursed …

We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n > k … bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state … observes the state. We show that there are equilibria in which the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of …

; and rst-price, second-price, and all-pay auctions. Second, we establish revenue equivalence of these auction mechanisms in … auctions. Finally, we identify an optimal mechanism and its implementation by means of reserve prices in lottery and auction …