A decision-maker solicits information from two partially informed experts and then makes a choice under uncertainty … information. I investigate the incentives of the experts to share their private information with the decision-maker and analyze …. The experts can be either moderately or extremely biased relative to the decision-maker, which is their private …

derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … efficiency in experimentation. This private information in the experimentation stage generates asymmetric information in the … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse candidates and endorsements are … observed by the voters. We show that the equilibrium election outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though … decentralized in the sense that individual experts have no incentive to exert influence. The effect arises when some agents prefer …

We study a model in which two perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the … welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different … degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision …

We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by … followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased toward the experts' interests even though … followers know the distribution of expert interests and can account for it when evaluating observed experts' actions. Expert …

An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the … probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront payment that the consultant can either invest in information … entrepreneurs so long as his referrals remain high. The principal under-utilizes information in settings (i) and (ii). In setting …

information between two national regulators. The model concentrates on informational frictions in an environment with otherwise … some regulatory information creates misreporting incentives. However, the major problem is not the reporting accuracy but …

which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey …