, i.e., misreporting of the precision of obtained information. In turn, this gives rise to specific predictions regarding …

A decision-maker solicits information from two partially informed experts and then makes a choice under uncertainty … information. I investigate the incentives of the experts to share their private information with the decision-maker and analyze …. The experts can be either moderately or extremely biased relative to the decision-maker, which is their private …

information about their costs. We show that cheap talk between the firms cannot transmit any information. However, if the firms …

transmit less information when the public signal is more informative. I also examine the optimal timing of the sender's report …

does not. Before the buyer decides how many units to purchase, the seller can disclose verifiable information about the … good. The better the information, the more the buyer is inclined to buy. The information about the good is two …, but unaware of the second. Here, unawareness refers to a lack of conception rather than lack of information. In the …

We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete‐information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers …. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over … additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a "revelation‐principle" result for settings …

derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … efficiency in experimentation. This private information in the experimentation stage generates asymmetric information in the … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse candidates and endorsements are … observed by the voters. We show that the equilibrium election outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though … decentralized in the sense that individual experts have no incentive to exert influence. The effect arises when some agents prefer …

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus …

We study a model in which two perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the … welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different … degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision …